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Insofar as this is the first issue of
an occasional paper by The John Dewey
Society, the lack of an established response format leaves me relieved and yet
anxious. Relief is experienced in terms
of feeling free of the vexing problem of
format constraint, but anxiety is felt
in terms of the personal judgment that
the response should be such that it
might be worthy of future replication.
Hence, bearing these thoughts in mind, I
am pleased to have the opportunity to
respond to Professor Pizzillo's
paper
because the topic he has chosen appeals,
perhaps fascinates, huge audiences, not
solely because bilingualism and pluralism "are in the air" but because each
offers "the glimpse behind the curtain"
in terms of what it is to live a different way of life, to perceive oneself and
the world in quite a different way. Each
reveals aspects of American life rarely
caught except in certain novels or in
movies
like
The
Goodfather and the
Swedish import, The Emigrants.

In his paper, Pizzillo has set forth
a description of the prevalent state of
bilingual education and has proposed
reasons for directing our attention and
effort toward asking some hard questions
and making bilingual education a muchneeded and vital part of the American
educational experience.
His
general
aim, I take it, is to provoke each reader to self-inquiry; to realize
that
there is no single culture in the United
States whose symbols, values, roles, attitudes, or general life-style, are acceptable to all.
In short, Pizzillo
wishes to alert us to a new ethnic consciousness, one that delights in the
glory of America's recently rediscovered
pluralism.
These are most provocative considerations, demanding our attention
and
critical judgment.
I want, therefore,
in the first part of my response, to
offer a critical account of some of
Pizzillo's basic ideas, which seem to me
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intrinsically interesting and, moreover,
important for education.
In the second
part of my response, I will formulate
certain criticisms and reservations concerning the basic features of Pizzillo's
descriptive account. My remarks in this
section will be grouped under three
headings:
"Conceptual and Moral Difficulties," "Cultural Diversity and Cultural Pluralism," and
"Instructional
Problems."

A Critical Account
We have much to learn from Pizzillo's
paper.
It is readily agreed that it is
perhaps impossible to exaggerate the importance of language acquisition in the
education of our children.
He warns us
that bilingual education is not new in
the United States, having its roots in
America's diversity of an earlier period.
The commitment to bilingual education, according to Pizzillo, was choked
off by the rising tide of American nationalism that emerged along with World
War I.
The return or reinstatement of
bilingual education came about, at least
in part, by the awareness that the educational level of Mexican-Americans, revealed in the data of the 1960 national
census, was considerably below the national average.
After
considerable
effort in Congress, the Bilingual Education Act Title VII of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act was passed.
Bilingual education, according
to
Pizzillo, is demanded and quite fashionable today. Public interest and support
continue at high levels. He gives short
shrift to glorified versions of remedial
reading programs or English-as-a-SecondLanguage programs, and proposes that increasing the student's competency in two
languages, his native tongue and English, employing both as a vehicle for
content instruction, is called for. But
along with the instructional use of
language should go an emphasis on culture.
Pizzillo, following
Rodriguez,
informs us that "language is not just an
instrument for communication and learning; it is a set of values.
Bilingual

education is, then, best viewed as bilingual-bicultural education."
Pizzillo's definition of bilingual
education is crucial, for the entire
thrust of his argument turns on the acceptance of bilingual education as bilingual-bicultural education. In such a
program, there is no merit in learning a
new language just for the sake of exercising certain skills.
If the bilingual-bicultural education program does
anything at all, it is to develop an integrated personality, enhance a positive
self-concept, and promote cultural understanding.
If it is eminently successful, the bicultural individual has
developed a high level of proficiency in
two languages, neither preferring one to
the other, but using either one in the
appropriate situation, and has mastered
the nuances of two distinct cultures.
In a discussion of the target audience of bilingual education in three
states, Pizzillo makes explicit the primary thrust of bilingual
education,
which is, of course, the inclusion of a
second language other than English, the
official
language
of
the American
school, on an equal footing.
His discussion of the characteristics of existing programs is highly descriptive and
too elaborate to summarize here, but he
intends that the reader will come to appreciate variant forms and possibilities
of the different approaches to bilingual
education programs.
One irony is to be considered in connection with the above.
I found myself
not so much impressed by the great variations and possibilities in the existing
programs but puzzled by the cumulative
effect
arrived
at
after reading
Pizzillo's admittance that "there is
considerable variation among the communities in which bilingual education programs exist," "bilingual programs range
in grade levels from pre-school and
kindergarten through twelfth
grade,"
"the many programs differ considerably
in emphasis," "There is little consensus about the methods to be used in
bilingual programs," and "finding quali-
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fied bilingual staff has been a problem." With regard to materials, "there
is wide diversity among bilingual programs in terms of material used."
Finally we are informed that "the field of
bilingual education is still in a developmental state."
Yet, despite the foregoing itemization, Pizzillo tells us that "schools
with bilingual programs can serve as
catalysts for the integration of diverse
cultures within a community." He claims
that "this can be accomplished in part
by the teacher, with the community's
assistance."
Giving the teacher this
very important function, Pizzillo considers certain cultural
competencies
needed by teachers in bilingual settings. Finally, he proposes that:
On a national basis, generally, bilingualism fosters
cultural pluralism in our international society, "through
maintenance of the lingualcultural heritages of various
groups—a concept which
is
consistent with the democratic
principle of choice, central
to the American way of life—
principles now rejected in a
free society, and associated
with the myth of the 'melting
pot' tradition."
What
is
wanted,
according
to
Pizzillo, is a pluralism where not only
do the members of society function successfully in one, two, or more languages
and cultural styles but where individuals can abide by and function successfully adhering to different customs and
languages, and to less crippling language stereotypes than those accepted today. In sum, bilingual education is offered in the hope of promoting a society
where groups function without cultural
bias, and are behaviorally committed to
the value that no one race, culture, or
language is preferred prima facie over
another.
The above sketch of Pizzillo's

ideas

does not do justice to the detail of his
treatment, but his main points are, I
believe, now evident and I turn thus to
the positive consideration of their import, adding further detail as the need
may arise.
First, I should express by agreement
with much of what Pizzillo has to say on
the topic of bilingual education. Surely
the state of language instruction in the
United States is vulnerable to the criticisms he offers. In particular, recognition of the functional
illiteracy
problem
of many non-English-speaking
children in America should move us to
some new ideas to deal with the problem.
The fact that children in the United
States are living in a society of persons who come from a variety of racial
and cultural backgrounds, and that, if
individual learning and growth are to be
enhanced, each child must be helped to
come to terms with the reality of his
own significance, and must be able to
express this sense in behavior, means we
need to help children experience their
worth both as individuals and as cultural beings.
Only if we acknowledge
and show respect for cultural differences in values, beliefs, and behaviors
that exist among our children will we be
able to foster positive and constructive
learning.
Second, I applaud the notion that
children should use their mother tongue
and be able to relate it to their identities.
If we accept rather generally
the notion that culture is "the general
method by which a group of people organizes its life from the cradle to the
grave," we take into account the idea
that culture is a method or tool constructed for dealing with common life
problems.
These problems are,
of
course, experienced by all groups, and
yet there is no universally accepted
pattern for handling any of these problems .
Different cultural patterns are
thus different solutions to the same human problems. Hence, difference does not
entail nor imply inferiority.
It is
harmful and destructive for any child to
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be led, either explicitly or implicitly,
to believe that cultural differences are
hierarchically arranged with, say, middle-class Anglo-American culture being
somewhat better than other cultures in
our nation, or that Anglos
are better
than non-Anglos.
Non-English-speaking
children
in
America need to experience that the
language they bring with them to school
is valued as an asset to be used and respected.
Moreover,
English-speaking
children need to learn that another
language can be a valuable tool for
learning, for conceptualizing, and for
interpersonal relations. Bilingual education is therefore good because it can
help many of our students understand and
respect the deep meaning that language
has for personal identity and worth,
both for themselves and for others.
Finally, I endorse the implicit objective of bilingual education of fostering the core belief that every culture is good and intrinsically worthwhile. I presume that such an aim seeks
to enpower children who are receptive
and flexible in facing culturally diverse values, beliefs, and lifestyles.
Having indicated a broad area of
agreement, I proceed now to formulate
certain criticisms and reservations concerning basic features of Pizzillo's
account.

Conceptual and Moral Difficulties
What mainly is at rock-bottom in
Pizzillo's paper is the concept of bilingualism.
But just what is bilingualism? It is not clear from Pizzillo's
account what it is.
But surely its explication is basic to understanding the
concept of bilingual-bicultural
education put forth.
We would profit from
an ordinary language
analysis
that
reveals customary uses, distinctions,
relations, emphases and so on. However,
because of the limitation of time, perhaps it will suffice to recognize that
the concepts of bilingualism and bi-

culturalism are related, but not identical.
We commonly take note of the
fact that large minority groups in the
United States who are bilingual also
have a culture that is different from
the host or dominant Anglo-American culture. For instance, in the Southwest all
the bilingual people speak Spanish or an
Indian dialect. Hence, in the Southwest
bilingualism always connotes biculturalism.
But it takes only a moment's reflection to see that some minority group
members, even though bilingual, may not
be bicultural. The literature on American immigrants and their children is
complete with such examples, particularly in the case of the second generation.
Many of these have been portrayed as
typically "marginal persons"
groping
aimlessly and accepting
fortuitously
from either culture. Or, to take another
tack, we can see that a group may indeed
be bicultural, as in the example of the
Jew who spends part of his daily life
immersed in secondary relationships involving business
with gentiles,
but
whose home life and primary associations
are spent wholly with other Jews. It is
not inconceivable to think of a Jew who
shares two cultures, but speaks only
English.
Hence, even though interrelated and
interdependent, biculturalism and bilingualism are not identical terms. Bilingualism, in its most ordinary employment, means fluency in at least two
languages, including oral communication,
the encoding and decoding of written
symbols, and the correct inflection,
pitch, etc. commonly called the superimposed structure of a language. Facility
in the use of two languages may range
from a minimal competency in either
language to a high level of proficiency
in both.
Generally speaking, however,
the bilingual person tends to be more
proficient in one language than the
other even though he may have attained a
high level of proficiency in both languages.1
Biculturalism, on the other
hand, refers to the cultural elements
that may include language but go beyond
language, insofar as it is a functional
awareness and participation in two con-
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trasting sociocultures (statuses, roles,
values, etc.).
Thus for the purpose of
clarifying the conceptual
difficulty
here, if it is only the language fluency
that is assessed as bilingual, it is obvious that bilingualism is not biculturalism.
Hence, it is possible to attain
bilingualism without dual acculturation
and biculturalism can be achieved without bilingualism.
Does our briefly put description of
"bilingual" offer us any warrant for asserting more than "having a fluency in
two languages"? I doubt it. How, then,
does Pizzillo's account move from bilingual education to bilingual-bicultural education?
Bilingualism, adapted
to groups by Pizzillo, gives the connotation that self-images, emotions, intellects, and different socio-economic
levels of living must be connected to
the point of amalgamation of languages
with
people.
This then leads to
Pizzillo's conclusion that much more
than fluency in two languages is necessary.
He proposes, in effect, melting
two cultures through the vehicle of language, namely, bilingual-bicultural education .
My major criticism is that Pizzillo's
argument for bilingual education turns
on a definition of bilingual education
that "wraps up" bicultural education.
That is, as against those interested in
English-as-a-Second-Language or monolingual education, Pizzillo declares that
bilingual education should increase the
student's competency in both English
and, say, Spanish, and both should be
used concurrently as media of instruction in any portion of the curriculum
except the languages themselves.
Thus,
for instance, science will be taught in
both Spanish and English, or arithmetic
in Spanish and social studies in English.
But without the least acknowledgement of the radical differences in
context of bilingual education and bicultural education, or the morally crucial variations of the meaning of 'bilingual' and 'bicultural,'
Pizzillo's
discussion glides easily and
resoundingly from the notion of bilingual edu-

i

cation to that of
education.

bilingual-bicultural

There is a sense in which it would be
hard to find a better example of the
danger of naively defining a term in educational discourse in order to win acceptance of the program offered.
In
brief, Pizzillo has not offered us a reportive definition of bilingual education, but has stipulated its use to include biculturalism.
Moreover, something of importance is taking place in
this "move".
Pizzillo's
definition
raises much more than instructional concerns; practical and moral issues are
posed.
My major point is that it would
be foolish to challenge the accuracy or
form of Pizzillo's definition of bicultural education.
Rather, as
Isreal
Scheffler tells us, 2 what needs to be
examined and justified is the program
(in its moral and practical aspects)
called for by the definition.
Pizzillo's point, I take it, is that
a program that is bilingual without also
being bicultural restricts a child's
learning as well as demeans him. Such a
program denies the deep psychological
and social meaning of language, and is
merely a "bridge model" of bilingual edcation which, if successful, has the
effect of phasing out the non-English
language as soon as possible.
Thus his
programmatic definition of bilingual education rules out the teaching of a second language that stresses only skills
(TESOL: Teaching of English to Speakers
of Other Languages), and any other of
the.so-called "bridge" models.
Rather than take issue with the definition, it would be of interest to find
out what evidence exists concerning the
efficacy of Pizzillo's bilingual education versus the bridge models?
Is one
program more productive of students capable of getting and holding onto jobs,
not just menial ones, but jobs with a
future? What of the financial cost? The
Lau vs. Nichols decision mandating
bilingual education programs and their
successful establishment is a wide gap
to fill.3 It will require trained teach-
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ers in bilingual education and new curriculum material. According to Pizzillo,
there is a dearth of both. Which type of
bilingual program can best accommodate
large-scale in-service work by the universities?
At what cost?
Many state
legislatures will be involved, since the
programs require a larger percentage of
school money to come from state funds.
The implementation of bilingual programs
by school districts and universities
will, to a great extent, be dependent on
how the legislators assess the cost and
efficacy of the various versions of bilingual education programs.
State legislators and school district officials
will have to review carefully the "hard
data" on this matter.
In any event, a
decision that has such great importance
is not to be decided by a programmatic
definition of bilingual education, but
on the basis of accurate and reasoned
judgments. Important questions of practical import require critical and careful judgment, not merely solution by
definitional fiat.
However, I suspect that Pizzillo's
definition of bilingual education hides
another important point, namely, a value
question.
His definition commits us to
the value that a bilingual education
that fails to deal with the attitudes,
theories, values, etc. of another socioculture cannot produce a "truly" bicultural individual.
If this is what
Pizzillo intends, then a question needs
to be asked.
Clearly Pizzillo regards
bilingual education as an instrument or
process necessary for producing the valued bicultural individual. The question
becomes:
Is this valid? Is the bicultural individual best produced by a bilingual education program? It seems that
we have here something akin to earlier
views of pedagogy that considered mathematics to be the best means of producing
someone knowledgeable about logic.
In
other words, we taught math in order to
teach students logic. Today we know that
there is something dreadfully wrong with
teaching A explicitly in order to arrive
at students learning B implicitly.
If
this analogy holds, then perhaps the
claim should become that "true" bilin-

gualism is better attained when the individual becomes bicultural rather than
bilingualism
produces
biculturalism.
However, it is unclear to me what the
answer is to the question just posed.
But perhaps Pizzillo's breaking down
of the distinction between bilingual and
bicultural into bilingual-bicultural education aims to commit us to the position that although the relationship between the two terms is not necessarily a
natural, commonplace one, it should be.
He may be warning us that while it is
possible to be bicultural to some extent
without knowing the language of the second culture, "complete" biculturalism
cannot be achieved without high levels
of proficiency in the languages of both
cultures. The valued bicultural student
envisioned by Pizzillo has a
firsthand
knowledge of, and acquaintance with, the
roles that he is expected to play in the
two sociocultures.
Not only does he
know how to play these roles but he is
we11-versed in and has some emotional
commitment to the value systems of both
cultures.
He knows not only the spoken
language of both cultures, but knows the
"silent
language" in playing
these
roles. Moreover, he neither intrinsically prefers one socioculture to the other, but rather uses either system in the
appropriate situation.
No one could guess, from Pizzillo's
account, that there is any problem of
arguing from facts to values, since he
is quite forthright in pronouncing his
values, and makes little effort to avoiding giving the impression that these
values are proper and thoroughly democratic.
Indeed, at one point,
after
telling us that the curriculum and
the
orientation of teacher training must be
reorganized so that "the English-speaking Anglo-oriented perspective is shared
with other viewpoints and ideas," he declares that "bilingual education allows
people to live in and be part of two
cultures."
Yet he never explains how
the bas ic justification of his programmatic definition of bilingual education
can yield all the value judgments he
offers nor, alternatively, what their
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warrant is.
It is objected, in ether
words, that such claims as "bilingual
education
would
seem
pedagogically
sound.
Educators stress the importance
of allowing the individual to begin and
maintain his schooling in his first language" make the case for Pizzillo's bilingual education.
We must not take it
for granted that there is no need to
differentiate between a bilingual education program that is taught as a worry
-free activity in a purely academic setting and one which is taught as a survival technique for those whose survival
depends on learning another language.
For the non-English speaking student,
the latter may obtain; for the AngloAmerican student, the former may be the
case.
For the sake of greater clarity
and moral integrity, it would have been
helpful if Pizzillo had addressed himself to this problem.

Cultural Diversity and Cultural
Pluralism
In this section I wish to consider
Pizzillo's effort to persuade us of the
importance of bilingual education because of its intimate connection to and
significance for pluralism (read:
cultural pluralism). Hence, he has not only
offered a rationale for bilingual education that claims pedagogical soundness
and the stamp of moral authority, but he
has given us pluralism as its social
significance. There are danger signals,
however, in that this position may be
either socially naive and/or logically
confused.
Social
naivete
is
exhibited by
Pizzillo insofar as his piece is largely
historical.
From a not too distant
historical perspective, foreign language
instruction in general and bilingual education in particular has been tied to a
deep class bias in the United States.
For generations the children of immigrants tried to rid themselves of the
stigma of employing a second language,
particularly with an accent. Speaking a
second language was a mark of class,
either denoting a recently arrived or

nonacculturated immigrant family
thus,
generally speaking, marking a
lower
class person
or it was a quality distinguishing the elite, the wealthy, the
indolent rich or refined minority, whose
survival did not depend upon learning a
second language, but whose rank demanded
it.
This class acquired a second language as a mark of status or wealth,
and it reflected leisuretime
learning.
But in either instance, ability to speak
a second language was considered a class
symbol in America, either of the class
below or the class above, and in many
respects the symbol was to be avoided.
There are, of course, numerous exceptions
to
the
above generalization.
Mainly the exceptions have come from religious communities where the learning
of a second language
Hebrew, German,
French, and the like—was considered essential in the moral training of children.
But, actually, few adults have
had a strong desire to become bilingual,
no less bicultural.
For many, it would
seem, to be asked to become bilingual
would be no less an affront than to be
asked to become bisexual.
It seems to
be the case that many American parents,
for one reason or another, refuse to expend the time and energy needed to acquire bilingualism, although they would
like their children to develop a speaking facility in a second or even a third
language, but remain Anglo-Americans who
know another language or two.
My claim is that Pizzillo is socially
naive insofar as he fails to take account of this cultural bias.
He takes
pains to argue that bilingual children
are advantaged, and the entire effort of
his paper stems in one way or another
from an effort to give significance to
the bicultural individual. If we recall
that biculturalism refers to the cultural elements that may include language
but go beyond language, then a program
of bicultural education may be more easily accepted by parents than a program
of bilingual education.
Naivete is replaced by the more sophisticated judgment that bilingualism is better
attained when the individual becomes bi-
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cultural.
Logical confusion is exhibited by
Pizzillo in a common but deplorable confusion that mistakes cultural diversity
for cultural pluralism, the social theory that supports cultural
diversity.
Pizzillo simply equates the two. Implicitly he accepts and values the notion
of diverse cultures living side, by side,
each enhancing the other, yet each assured of its own worth and value.
The
two terms are indeed related, but are
not the same.
Let us see why this is
so.
To explain how different human groups
were originally distinguished is beyond
the scope of this response; suffice
it
to say that two facts stand out. First,
it is clear that "human groups do not
exist in nature, or rather, the part of
difference that exists because of nature
is unimportant."4 Whenever distinctions
or differentiations are made and groupings result, it is we who make
them.
Second, the distinctions that men make
to create groups may be drawn along all
sorts of lines; indeed, there seems
to
be no end to human ingenuity in thinking
of characteristics that can set groups
apart.
Hence, we are all familiar with
the realization that diversity may and
does take different forms.
But what is
claimed here? What does it mean to say
that some groups are diverse?
At rockbottom we would say that the decision to
regard any group as diverse signifies a
decision on somebody's part to single
out different factors in the groupingssuch as skin color, beliefs, ancestral
heritage, language—and establish these
as criteria for the basis of the socalled diversity.
The point is, of course, that diversity of some sort exists everywhere and
is visible everywhere. Every society is
diverse in some respects, but this observation can only be made from a certain point of view.
It could be made
only be somebody who looks at a number
of people and because of some reason or
other finds it important to observe that

some members are different. While seeing
that everybody is diverse in some respect, it should not go
recognized
that we make certain criteria count in
establishing differences.
To turn the
coin over, when we say that a particular
group is homogeneous, we mean simply
that the ways in which the members differ are unimportant or irrelevant to any
practical concerns.
However, we do not
suggest that there are no differences.
When we say that a society is diverse,
we are saying that from a particular
vantage point we find something relevant, interesting, and for some reason
important to mark off a group or groups
as different.
Thus, we may identify
differences of exclusiveness along the
lines of cultural difference, and group
identify may be ordered along the lines
of ritual, dietary habits, beliefs, folk
tales, and language pattern.
One or a
combination of these aspects generally
is regarded as necessary for identifying
a group as culturally diverse.
But is this sufficient for establishing cultural diversity?
No analysis of
cultural diversity is complete without a
recognition that the selected differences between groups must be viewed as
fundamental enough to be capable of producing values and dispositions that contribute to significantly different outlooks on the world. The variety or variegation of unlikeness among groups must
be capable of making a difference—the
difference must have reality in the
minds of men, not just in the eye of the
beholder.
The point to be observed is
that cultural diversity within society
must have a concrete social reality; it
must be made incarnate within the behaviors of the people. It must be expressed
in a concrete situation which bears on
political, economic, and social policy.
Hence, the second condition that must be
met for a society to be culturally diverse is that diversity go beyond being
merely visible; diversity must be exhibited in the social behavior of groups
who wish to embody their views in choos-
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ing among the various social arrangements which determine the division of
advantages for underwriting an agreement on the proper distribution of goods
and services.
But even this is not sufficient. Diversity is not a matter of genetics; it
is a matter of cultural transmission
across generations. Hence, a third condition of cultural diversity would require that a sense of historical
and
participational identity and the peculiar traits which mark the identity must
be transmitted from generation to generation if the group is to continue to
maintain its identity.
It is doubtful
that any group could long maintain its
peculiar features if it did not jealously guard them and limit the members1
sphere of relations, particularly in the
decisive period of formation, namely,
childhood.
With these three conditions in mind,
we may further identify what 'cultural
diversity' expresses. We can start with
its descriptive use. As a descriptive
term, at the very least, 'cultural diversity' refers to the coexistence of
unlike or variegated groups in a common
social system.
It makes no judgments
about this situation, for it is employed
simply to record the fact that different
groups are able to live together in such
a way that allows the society to accomplish the basic functions of producing
and distributing goods, defining social
arrangements and institutions which determine collective goals, and providing
security.
But 'cultural diversity' may be also
used normatively to express a social
ideal.
As a social value, the phrase
goes beyond the descriptive sense to emphasize the value of freedom of association, the so-called "democratic ideal."
That is, a culturally diverse society is
commonly portrayed as a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage—everyone
profits from a plurality of groups expressing different values and interests.
Thomas F. Green expressed
this point

most eloquently:
The view is that any society
is richer if it will allow a
thousand flowers
to bloom.
The
assumption is that
no
man's culture or way of life
is so rich that it may not be
further enriched by contact
with other points of view. The
conviction is that diversity
is enriching because no man
has a monopoly on the truth
about the good life. There are
many ways.
Diversity is further valued because it provides any society with a richer pool of leadership from
which to draw in times of
c
crisis.
Green develops this position by observing that the value of diversity entails
two further assumptions.
In the first place it means
that there must be contact between the divergent groups in
society.
A household may be
richer for including persons
of different aspirations, values, dispositions, and points
of view. But these differences
will not be enriching to any
particular individual unless
he talks with, eats with, or
in some way has an exchange of
views with those who are different. The value of diversity implies contact
between
persons, and not simply incidental, temporary, and casual
contacts. Secondly this fundamental value implies that the
diversity which is enriching
is not itself endangered by
the contact which is valued.
The diversity must be sustained through contact.7
If Green is right, then it seems that
cultural diversity as a social ideal
wraps up certain fundamental values or
beliefs.
It demands that different
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groups coexist with one another, having
more than mere fleeting or casual contact, and it presumes that such contact
will not limit or endanger but will enrich the diversity.
Cultural diversity as a social ideal
is immensely significant for public education.
Our understanding of the ideal
could influence the positions we take on
the issue of informal or casual education versus formal education or schooling as well as determining the flexibility we allow to public education in accommodating religious and language differences .
But if the ideal of cultural
diversity is to have any influence in
determining practical educational issues, it will do so to the extent that
the ideal is embodied in and expressed
through the decision-making of men in
voting their various agendas of politics. In other words, the ideal of cultural diversity will or will not be expressed in no other terms than in the
reality of American social structure.
From the view of social structure,
American society has had difficulty in
accepting cultural diversity.
There is
strong evidence that cultural diversity
has been viewed as potentially divisive.
The point is that the United States has
been seen as a congerie of culturally
diverse
(and
potentially
divisive)
groups, most with distinctive social,
economic, and political concerns, who
prefer living with other members of
their group and take pride in efforts to
sustain and build up group self-confidence and self-assertiveness. The divisive tendencies of cultural diversity
have been seen as promoting a view of
politics which makes of local and state
governments a federation of groups, with
protected and excluded turfs.
Reasons for the lack of congruence
between cultural diversity as social
ideal and as realized in social institutions are found in the hard core of the
American experience.
Since most Americans have no ethnic roots in past millennia, as do so many other peoples of

the world, the Americanization process
has taken on a central role in the formation of a national identity and selfconcept. What is unique in the American
experience is not the fact that the naturalization of immigrants has taken
place, but rather that we have the example of a new nation starting
from
scratch, as it were.
In fact, to question the wisdom of the necessity for engaging in the Americanization of immigrants has struck many as questioning
the very possibility of America's continued national and cultural well-being.
Both the explanation and the fact of Americanization have affected the nature
and function of cultural diversity, and
both have done so in a cumulative and
accelerating fashion.
But what of cultural pluralism? Varying degrees of confusion surround the
concept since its inception by Horace M.
Kallen in the second decade of the present century.8 In 1915 Kallen predicted
the realization of cultural pluralism in
the United States as:
. . . a federal republic; its
substance a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily
and
autonomously
through common institutions in
the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection
of men according to
their
kind.
The common language of
the commonwealth, the language
of its great tradition, would
be English, but each nationality would have for its emotional and involuntary life
its own peculiar dialect or
speech, its own individual and
inevitable esthetic and intellectual forms.
The political
and economic life of the commonwealth is a single unit and
serves as the foundation and
background for the realization
of the distinctive individuality of each natio /sic/ that
composes it and of the pooling
of these in a harmony above
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them all. Thus "American civilization" may come to mean
the perfection of the cooperative harmonies of "European
civilization"
the waste, the
squalor and the distress of
Europe being
eliminated
a
multiplicity in a unity, an
orchestration of mankind.9
What is crucial in such a statement
is the notion of cultural pluralism as
respectful of the dominant of core culture embodied in the English language,
values, and tradition.
Diversity and
its acceptance has been exhibited in
ethnic cuisines, Columbus days,
and
Pulaski skyways, but the respect tended
to those who diverged from the WASP
ideal was minimal at best and non-existent at worst.
Cultural pluralism, in
effect, remained more a myth of American
society than a concept which has supported
its institutions and practices.
The myth assumed that American society
would be able to fulfill
democratic
goals by absorbing differences. But the
fact is that American society did not
tolerate cultural diversity and insisted
on a pervasive sameness by all who wished to share in its resources. Moreover,
even those who were willing to abandon
their cultural backgrounds to gain their
share of "good life" were often denied
entrance into society.
Thus there were
those for whom the price was never too
high, those for whom the price was too
high, and there were those who were never allowed to know the price or pay the
price.
The re-emergence of the concept of
cultural pluralism in recent years is
perhaps testimony that the older myth is
no longer accepted today. Today's cultural pluralism, however, is decidedly
different than its predecessor. What is
different is the emphasis on cultural
pluralism, and its fundamental posture
is that individuals and groups can function successfully and democratically if
they believe that no one race, culture,
or language is preferred over another.
In short, cultural pluralism assumes the

following:
1. There must be a rejection
of any position that assumes
that some people are better
than others, that homogeneity
is better than heterogeneity,
and that some culture forms
(language, values, etc.) are
better than others.
2. There must be a rejection
of the model of the "preferred
American"—the WASP—and adoption of a view which encourages and supports diversity in
language, life-styles, religions , and any other cultural
characteristics.
Thus there is an important difference
between yesteryear's cultural pluralism
and today's cultural
pluralism.
The
former was found wanting because it was
used to create an illusion of respect
for cultural diversity and equality of
opportunity.
Non-whites and others did
not receive the rewards of society and
were held responsible for their failure.
Today's cultural pluralism, on the other
hand, demands that Native Americans,
Blacks, women, Puerto Ricans, Cubans,
Jews, and any group feeling different or
which dares to be different have access
to the resources, privileges, and power
of American society. A corollary of this
view includes the rejection of concepts,
institutions, and actions which reward
individuals or groups on the basis of
race, culture, sex, class, and national
origin.
It would, perhaps, be helpful to suggest a kind of formula for seeing the
relationship between cultural pluralism
and cultural diversity.
This relationship may be put in this way:
1. CP (cultural pluralism) is
desirable as an end.
2. In present-day society, CD
(cultural diversity) as a social ideal is the best way of
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achieving CP.
3. Therefore, do whatever
involves.

CD

In short, the new cultural pluralism
is a response to a changed situation;
one that is not satisfied with a mere
acknowledgement of diversity of cultures
in American society.
The fact is that
the United States has included citizens
of diverse cultures; it is also a fact
that many groups have been disenfranchized or "made invisible" for generations. Cultural pluralism recognizes and
celebrates America's diversity but goes
further to demand a state of equal coexistence in a mutually supportive relationship within the framework of each
person securing his own identity, and
willing to extend to others.the same respect and rights that he expects to enjoy himself.
Hence, the concept of cultural pluralism suggests a movement of affection
and identify, enriched perhaps by the
subtle, provocative ways in which one
differs from others, and reinforced by a
strong attachment to one's diversity.
The concept, in other words, makes a
great deal of cultural diversity and is
a force for asserting claims against the
institutions of society, for any oppressed group has the best chance of
changing the system if it raises the
communal consciousness of its individual
members.
The new emphasis on cultural pluralism does not require renaming it, but it
does give direction to those who, for
many reasons, experienced deprivation,
powerlessness, alienation, frustration,
and the like.
Consequently,
cultural
pluralism may now be seen to read: cultural socio-economic pluralism.
It demands political
and social policies
which would result in a more equal distribution of the goods, prerogatives,
and services of American society.
The major political and social policy
reflective of cultural pluralism in edu-

cation has been the development and implementation
of bilingual-bicultural
programs, both in the public schools and
in teacher education programs. Implicit
in the arguments of Pizzillo and others
linking bilingual education with bicultural education is the belief that these
programs will somehow "foster cultural
pluralism
in
our
intercultural
society. . . . "
According to Pizzillo,
Ideally, bilingual education
is intended to produce a balanced bilingualism-biculturalism within the learner, whereby he has the ability to function equally well in the two
linguistic and cultural contexts .
Pizzillo's programmatic definition of
bilingual-bicultural education makes the
assumption of the transferability of
bicultural skills into effective participation -in society.
Moreover, a bilingual education program aims to enable
each student to retain and develop his
cultural
identity while
he becomes
versed in the language and values of
mainstream America. Hence, for Pizzillo,
the product of bilingual education is
biculturalism:
the ability to function
competently and comfortably in the culture of the student's family as well as
the culture represented by the majority
of Americans.
The common assumption of cultural
pluralists is that cultural pluralism is
achievable through programs of bilingual-bicultural education. Non-Englishspeaking students, studying and interacting with English-speaking children,
will somehow work this out.
In effect,
the assumption is that cultural pluralism is to be had through schooling that
influences people's attitudes and behavior, so much so that institutions are
eventually changed.
But isn't this too
naive a view?
Doesn't our experience
suggest the limitations of schooling in
this and other regards? Cultural parity
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among diverse groups is not likely to be
achieved in public education alone. The
extent to which entrenched institutions
other than the school are reluctant to
grant cultural parity will determine
whether or not some sort of meaningful
cultural pluralism can be achieved.
Instructional Questions
To this point, I have attempted to
question broad-ranging aspects relating
to bilingual education.
There is, in
addition, another area of practical import to consider, namely, instructional
matters.
The primary thrust of bilingual education is, of course, the inclusion on
equal footing of a second language other
than English in the school. On the surface this would seem to be an innocent
enough objective.
But when the educational personnel of a school district
attempts to implement this objective, it
may be that there are certain problems
and implications that have to be considered.
For example, is it the case
that teaching one in his native language
is an irrelevancy?
Although Pizzillo
tells us that such a practice is "pedagogically sound," is what is really necessary in teaching, in whatever language, is love, compassion, understanding, dignity, respect, etc.?
Although
bilingual education programs do indeed
attempt this, is this "good teaching"
syndrome necessarily excluded from other
forms of language education programs? It
may be, I suspect, but I do not think
Pizzillo has sufficiently made the case
for it.
We are left with little or no
idea about such an important consideration.
More specifically, however, Pizzillo
never tells us whether the second language is going to be used to move the
student faster into adequate proficiency
in English so as to ensure the non-English-speaking student normal progress in
schooling. We are unsure whether or not
the English-speaking student will be
graded in terms of developing equal pro-

ficiency in both languages.
Is it the
case that the non-English-speaking and
English-speaking student will be expected to develop equal proficiency in
both languages?
If so, to what levels
will they be raised? These are questions
that must be raised and answered if anyone is going to take bilingual education
seriously.
What is perhaps even more important
for the educator is the instructional
question of bilingual education itself.
That is, what does it mean when we say
that students will be taught in two languages? If we take the Spanish communities in the United States as our example, we readily see that there are
strong language clashes within the general language area, so that Puerto Ricans, in New York City, Cubans in Miami,
and Texas Mexicans in El Paso find their
own language differences quite exaggerated.
Pizzillo,
following
Steiner,
claims that, "chicanos are developing an
authentic third language which is neither Spanish nor English, and which has
developed so far as to be creating its
own literature."
Thus quite innocently
we come to the vexing question of "what
counts as two languages?"
The question
of what counts as a language is indeed
important, but an instructional question
of major concern is:
Are we talking about bilingual or trilingual education?
Is the Chicano's first language (TexMex) to be retaught as a second language
to attain literacy and to establish a
base of language on which English proficiency can be developed? Or is the Chicano to become literate in Tex-Mex only?
Is literacy demanded in at least two
languages? If so, then the Chicano student might need to become trilingual,
speaking Tex-Mex, and becoming literate
in both standard Spanish and English.
Another
question that has to
be
raised is what aspects of the bilingual
education program are to be taught in
which language? Are the sciences better
taught in English than, say, in Spanish?
Is the highly technical vocabulary
of
science more infused with English words
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than Spanish words?
If so, then is it
easier for the Spanish child to read
"science" because of the rather easily
identified English science words or does
the reverse hold true?
Would the using
of Spanish entail awkward and difficult
translations of technical terms—for example, how to translate into Spanish the
term "technology"?
What of history,
mathematics, etc.? What is the evidence
in this regard?
This is not the place to explore all
the questions facing the bilingual education teacher, but in particular it
seems necessary to raise one final consideration.
Consider the problem of
teaching students such
sophisticated
concepts as "slavery," "exploitation,"
"colonialism," or "authority."
These
concepts are abstract and
ordinarily
young children lack the rich content derived from personal experience to grasp
their meanings and use.
Acceptance of
Pizzillo's stance on bilingual education
would impose on the teacher the moral
choice of teaching the concept of authority in terms of, say, the MexicanAmerican who considers authority to be
embedded in the paternalistic, autocratic family and the offspring's role to be
that of an obedient, respectful son or
daughter in an intensely cooperative
family relationship.
Or, on the other
hand, teaching the concept of authority
of America's counter-culture which views
authority as suspect, contaminated, corrupt, and regards
authority relationships as neo-anarchists.
A
teacher
should not be in authority, nor even, in
R.S. Peter's distinction, be an_ authority. 10
At best the teacher is a friend,
his job is to expose his frailties in
the interests of mind-expansion, eliminating the artificial boundaries between
teacher and taught imposed by wrongheaded notions of authority.
The problem is a major one.
The
teacher is not merely giving cognitive
knowledge to his or her students, rather, teaching involves value stances. One
may talk about authority, but in the
second case above openness and vulnera-

bility are dispositional traits, not
cognitive beliefs, and they are the
prime requirements of teaching.
It
seems
imperative to
recognize that
teaching, wherever it occurs, generally
has conjoined cognitive, affective, and
behavioral involvements.
It has basic
and pervasive effects whose causes are
not located merely
in propositional
knowledge about something like "authority." The way one teaches the concept of
authority, the constraints on teaching,
helps shape the way children learn and
use the concept.
In any event, apart from the problem
just posed, the fundamental question of
practical consideration is this:
What
of teaching the same concept in two languages? Would not such an instructional
practice double the cost in terms of
energies and resources without the attainment of substantial gains? How sensible would be such a practice in terms
of the student, providing, of course,
that the teacher is capable of "pulling
it off"?
Is a double performance never
or always, or just possibly, a waste?
These are the kinds of instructional
questions that need extensive probing if
we are to clarify our ideas about bilingual education.

Conclusion
What must be the general conclusion
from what has been said thus far? To my
mind, the inescapable one that stands
out is the absolute necessity to recognize chat we have been toying with the
top of the iceberg; trying to avoid it
and feeling assured that nothing else
exists to threaten us.
Bilingual education programs, of whatever stripe and
purpose, merely represent the top of a
problem that goes much deeper.
At
bottom, is the recognition by
many
Americans that the traditional curriculum and language training are not appropriate today.
We should take more than
passing notice of the fact that what is
wanted by non-English-speaking Americans

is a greater share of the wealth and
power of American society, an according
of respect and dignity by groups historically considered to be "superior,"
and a social order that guarantees the
end to humiliation and denial of elementary human rights. It is tragic that the
United States has, in the past, offered
its allegiance not to fairness and justice to all but to self-interest, prejudice, and Anglo conformism.H
This is not the place to illustrate
in detail, nor do I command the rhetoric to speak, of the long history of
injustice suffered by America's racial
minorities and women, but I am deeply
aware that these groups will no longer
peaceably accept the existing distribution of power, domestic or international, and
the political-socio-economic
realities that flow from it.
Schoolmen
must expect that the terminology of the
social and behavioral sciences (e.g.,
culturally deprived) will no longer protect their actions from criticism and
attack.
But the long-suffering groups
should be aware of the fact that schooling has little to say, in the final analysis, about the problems of man and
society that really matter.
Bilingual
education programs, no matter how honest
and well-intentioned, cannot rectify the
distribution of power in favor of minorities nor can it be used to change domestic policies.
If the majority of Americans come to
be preoccupied with questions of human
dignity, worth, and justice for all,
then the schools might have an invaluable civilizing influence on such a
society.
If, as is more likely, such
questions are regarded with disdain,
then our minorities and women will have
to look elsewhere for enlightenment and
help.
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^ A very recent exception to this is the requirement, under amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, that 464 counties in 27 states, including every county in Texas, will have
to protect the voting rights of non-English-speaking citizens by conducting elections in
more than one language.
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special assistance—through ballots printed in languages other than English or through
other means—to ensure that all have an equal chance to participate in the electoral
process.
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As defined by the Voting Rights Act, minority groups entitled to this assistance
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in future bilingual elections.

